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SUMMARY
U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic
relations remained essentially frozen for more
than a decade after the 1975 communist vic-
tory in South Vietnam.  Washington and
Hanoi have incrementally normalized rela-
tions over the past decade.  The pace has been
relatively slow due to continued debate in the
United States and Vietnam over improved
relations.  Congress has played a significant
role in the normalization process.
Bilateral relations took a major step
forward in February 1994, when President
Clinton ordered an end to the 19-year old U.S.
trade embargo on Vietnam.  The following
year, the United States and Vietnam  settled
diplomatic and private property claims and
opened liaison offices in Washington and
Hanoi.  In April 1997, a U.S. Ambassador was
approved by the Senate and took up his post in
Hanoi. In March 1998, President Clinton
granted  a waiver from the Jackson-Vanik
amendment that smoothed the way for Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
and Export-Import Bank support for U.S.
business in Vietnam. 
On July 13, 2000, the U.S. and Vietnam
continued their normalization by signing a
sweeping bilateral trade agreement (BTA),
which was approved by Congress and signed
by President Bush in 2001.  Vietnam ratified
the agreement shortly thereafter. Under the
BTA, the U.S. extended normal trade relations
to Vietnam.  In return, Hanoi agreed to a range
of trade liberalization measures and market-
oriented reforms. 
Each step in improving bilateral ties has
brought controversy, albeit at diminishing
levels. U.S. opponents in Congress and else-
where have argued that Vietnam maintains a
poor record on human, religious, and labor
rights.  Opposition has also come from groups
arguing that Vietnam has not done enough to
account for U.S. Prisoners of War/Missing in
Action (POW/MIAs) from the Vietnam War,
though this argument has diminished
markedly in recent years.
Forces favoring normalization have
included those in Congress and elsewhere
reflecting a strong U.S. business interest in
Vietnam’s reforming economy and American
strategic interests in working with U.S. friends
and allies to promote stability and develop-
ment by integrating Vietnam more fully into
the existing East Asian order.
Within Vietnam, divisions over the
course of the country’s reforms have para-
lyzed Vietnamese leaders in recent years.
Reformers in the Vietnamese government seek
closer ties with the U.S., especially in eco-
nomic relations. However, conservatives have
resisted foreign influences that might
undermine the Vietnamese Communist Party’s




The U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement (BTA) entered into force on December 10,
2001, when the two countries formally exchanged letters implementing the agreement.
Under the agreement, the U.S. extended temporary normal trade relations (NTR, also known
as most-favored nation [MFN] status) to Vietnam.  In return, Hanoi agreed to undertake a
wide range of market-liberalization measures.  (See CRS Report RL30416, The Vietnam-
U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement, by Mark Manyin.)  A timetable has yet to be set for
beginning negotiations on the next major bilateral trade deal, a textile agreement, which
would set quotas on Vietnam’s apparel exports to the United States.  On June 3, 2002,
President Bush renewed Vietnam’s waiver from the requirements of the so-called Jackson-




U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic relations remained essentially frozen for over
a decade after the 1975 communist victory in South Vietnam, despite a few U.S. overtures
during the Carter Administration that were controversial domestically and were ultimately
thwarted by Vietnamese actions.
Policy Initiatives During the Carter Administration
In March 1977, President Carter sent a commission to Vietnam.  The United States no
longer vetoed Vietnam’s application for U.N. membership, paving the way for the July 20,
1977 U.N. Security Council recommendation — undertaken by consensus, without formal
vote — that Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations.  The United States proposed that
diplomatic relations quickly be established between the United States and Vietnam, after
which the United States would lift export and asset controls on Vietnam.  The Vietnamese
responded that they would neither agree to establish relations nor furnish information on U.S.
POW/MIAs until the United States pledged to provide several billion dollars in postwar
reconstruction aid.  Subsequently, they modified this position and provided some limited
information on MIAs, even though the United States provided no aid.
The U.S. Congress responded unfavorably to the Carter Administration initiatives and
the Vietnamese reaction.  In 1977, both houses of Congress went on record as strongly
opposing U.S. aid to Vietnam.
Vietnamese actions in 1978 in particular had a long-term negative effect on
U.S.-Vietnamese relations.  Vietnam expelled hundreds of thousands of its citizens (many
of Chinese origin) who then became refugees throughout Southeast Asia; aligned itself
economically and militarily with the USSR; and invaded Cambodia, deposing the
pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime and imposing a puppet Cambodian government backed
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by 200,000 Vietnamese troops.  China conducted a one month military incursion along
Vietnam’s northern border in 1979 and kept strong military pressure on the North until 1990.
In the face of these developments, the Carter Administration halted consideration  of
improved relations with Vietnam.  It worked closely with the members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — then made up of Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) to condemn and contain the Vietnamese expansion and
to cope with the influx of refugees from Indochina. 
Developments During the Reagan and Bush Administrations
The Reagan Administration opposed normal relations with Hanoi until there was a
verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, a position amended in 1985 to
include a verified withdrawal in the context of a comprehensive settlement.  Administration
officials also noted that progress toward normal relations depended on Vietnam fully
cooperating in obtaining the fullest possible accounting for U.S. personnel listed as prisoners
of war/missing in action (POW/MIAs).
As Vietnam withdrew forces from Cambodia in 1989 and sought a compromise peace
settlement there, the Bush Administration decided on July 18, 1990, to seek contacts with
Hanoi in order to assist international efforts to reach a peace agreement in Cambodia.
Regarding the issue of the POW/MIAs, following a visit to Hanoi by a U.S. presidential
delegation in 1987, Vietnam returned hundreds of sets of remains said to be those of U.S.
MIAs.  Some, but not most, were confirmed as American.  Altogether, from 1974 to 1992,
Vietnam returned the remains of over 300 Americans.  Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that
the Vietnamese “warehoused” several hundred remains and tactically released them in
increments.  The number of such remains and whether any are still held, is not known with
any certainty.  (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB92101, POWs and MIAs: Status and
Accounting Issues.)
In April 1991, the United States laid out a detailed “road map” for normalization with
Vietnam, welcomed Vietnam’s willingness to host a U.S. office in Hanoi to handle
POW/MIA affairs, and pledged $1 million for humanitarian aid (mainly prosthetics) to
Vietnam.  The U.S. office began operation in mid-1991, and the aid was transferred by the
end of FY1991.  Also in 1991, the United States eased travel restrictions on Vietnamese
diplomats stationed at the United Nations in New York and on U.S. organized travel to
Vietnam.
In 1992, Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters improved, especially in the area
of allowing U.S. investigators access to pursue “live sightings” reports.  Important
developments encouraged U.S. officials, armed with evidence (including photographs of
extensive Vietnamese archival information on U.S. POW/MIAs) to request greater access
to such data.  Vietnamese representatives agreed.  The United States pledged, and
subsequently paid out, $3 million of humanitarian aid (mainly prosthetics and aid to
abandoned or orphaned children)  for Vietnam; agreed to restore direct telecommunications
with Vietnam; agreed to allow U.S. commercial sales to meet basic human needs in Vietnam;
and lifted restrictions on projects in Vietnam by U.S. nongovernmental organizations.  The
United States pledged and provided a disaster assistance grant to Vietnamese flood victims
and provided additional aid to help Vietnam with malaria problems.  In November 1992, the
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United States lifted restrictions on U.S. telephone service to Vietnam, allowing direct service
between the two countries.  In December, the United States eased some restrictions on U.S.
companies doing business in Vietnam.
Coinciding with these developments, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs
conducted what many consider the most extensive independent investigation of the
POW/MIA issue undertaken.  The committee, chaired by John Kerry and vice-chaired by
Bob Smith, operated from August 1991 - December 1992.  In early 1993, the committee
issued its report, which concluded that there was some evidence that POWs were alive after
the U.S. withdrawal in 1973, and that although there was no “conspiracy” in Washington to
cover up live POWs, the U.S. government had seriously neglected and mismanaged the issue,
particularly in the 1970s.  The committee’s televised hearings played a major role in defusing
much of the passion that had surrounded the POW issue. 
Apart from Cambodia and the POW/MIA matter, the Reagan and Bush Administrations
concerned themselves with a third problem — humanitarian issues.  Major progress in
negotiations with Vietnam resulted in plans to:  facilitate emigration from Vietnam of
relatives of Vietnamese-Americans or permanent Vietnamese residents of the United States;
regulate the flow of Vietnamese immigrants to the United States and other countries under
the so-called Orderly Departure Program managed by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees; resolve the issue of the estimated several thousand Amerasians (whose fathers are
Americans and whose mothers are Vietnamese) who reportedly wish to emigrate from
Vietnam to the United States; and obtain release from Vietnamese prison camps and the
opportunity to immigrate to the United States of thousands of Vietnamese who worked for
the United States in South Vietnam or were otherwise associated with the U.S. war effort
there.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials in Congress and the Administration expressed repeatedly their
concern about the large numbers of political prisoners said to be in Vietnam, warning that
human rights is a central feature of U.S. foreign policy and could not but affect U.S. policy
toward Vietnam.
Developments During the Clinton Administration
Early moves to improve relations during the Clinton Administration included the
President’s announcement on July 2, 1993, that the United States would no longer oppose
arrangements supported by France, Japan, and others allowing for resumed international
financial institution aid to Vietnam; however, he said the U.S. economic embargo on
Vietnam would remain in effect. A high-level U.S. delegation visited Hanoi in mid-July to
press for progress on POW/MIAs; the delegation gave the Vietnamese leaders U.S.
documentary evidence that would help settle Vietnamese MIA cases; the delegation also
disclosed that U.S. consular officials would henceforth be stationed in Hanoi.  Individual
Members of Congress played an important behind-the-scenes role in encouraging the Clinton
Administration to take many of these, and subsequent, steps.
President Clinton’s September 13, 1993, renewal of his authority to maintain trade
embargoes included an eased version of the one on Vietnam that allowed U.S. companies to
bid on development projects funded by international financial institutions in Vietnam. Also
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in September, 1993, the Administration approved $3.5 million in U.S. aid to extend two
humanitarian programs (prostheses and orphans) in Vietnam.
On February 3, 1994, President Clinton ordered an end to the U.S. trade embargo on
Vietnam.  The action came after many months of high-level U.S. interaction with Vietnam
in resolving POW/MIA cases, and a January 27, 1994 vote in the Senate urging that the
embargo be lifted, language that was attached to broad authorizing legislation (H.R. 2333).
The language was controversial in the House, but H.R. 2333 passed Congress; it was signed
into law (P.L. 103-236) on April 30, 1994.
On January 25, 1995, the United States and Vietnam settled bilateral diplomatic and
property claims and opened liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi on February 1, and
February 3, 1995, respectively. The Treasury Department announced on March 9, 1995, that
it was unblocking accounts in which Vietnam or its nationals had an interest. On July 11,
1995, President Clinton announced that he would establish ambassadorial-level relations
with Vietnam.  The FY1996 State Department Appropriations bill (H.R. 2076) included
language barring funding for full diplomatic relations with Vietnam until more progress was
made on POW/MIA issues. President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2076 on December 19, 1995.  On
August 6, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher opened the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, and
Vietnam’s embassy in Washington opened on August 5, 1995.  An attempt in the Senate to
restrict trade ties with Vietnam failed on September 20, 1995.
Controversy continued in 1995 and 1996 over provisions in legislation (H.R. 1561) that
would place conditions on upgrading U.S. relations with Vietnam, and that would admit
additional boat people from camps in Hong Kong and elsewhere to the United States. H.R.
1561 passed Congress in March 1996, but was vetoed by the President, and the veto was
sustained on April 30, 1996.  A modified version of the Vietnam provisions in H.R. 2076
was signed by President Clinton on April 26, 1996, as part of H.R. 3019, the Omnibus
Appropriations bill (P.L. 104-134).  To comply with the provisions, President Clinton issued
Presidential Determination 96-28 on May 30, 1996, saying that Vietnam is cooperating in
full faith with the United States on POW/MIA issues.
On April 10, 1997, the Senate approved former Vietnam War POW and Member of
Congress Pete Peterson as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.
In Vietnam in late June 1997, Secretary of State Albright urged greater economic reform
and better human rights; she signed a bilateral agreement on copyrights and said that the U.S.
Trade and Development Program would conduct business in Vietnam.
On December 18, 1997, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said the
Administration was consulting with Congress on granting Vietnam a waiver from the
Jackson-Vanik amendment that would smooth the way for Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) and Export-Import Bank to support U.S. business activities in Vietnam.
On March 11, 1998, President Clinton granted  the waiver, and a formal agreement on OPIC
was signed eight days later.  On November 30, 1999, OPIC signed its first financing
agreement – a $2.3 million loan to Caterpillar Inc.’s authorized dealership in Vietnam – for
American business in Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War.  The U.S. Export-Import
Bank announced on April 10, 1998 that it was ready to finance sales to Vietnam.  On
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December 9, 1999, the Ex-Im Bank signed two framework agreements with the State Bank
of Vietnam to facilitate project financing cooperation between the two agencies. 
On June 3, 1998, President Clinton issued a required annual waiver on Jackson-Vanik
amendment restrictions regarding Vietnam, China, and other countries. Joint disapproval
resolutions were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 47) and the House (H.J.Res. 120) on June
4, 1998.  They were reported adversely by the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Ways and Means Committee.  H.J.Res. 120 was defeated in the House on July 30, 1998, roll
call #356 (163 - 260). 
On June 3, 1999, President Clinton again issued an annual waiver on Jackson-Vanik
amendment restrictions on U.S. interactions with Vietnam.  Joint resolutions disapproving
the President’s action were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 28, June 7) and the House
(H.J.Res. 58, June 9).  On July 20, the Senate rejected a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 28 from
committee, effectively defeating the measure, roll call #214 (5-94).  On August 3, the House
voted down H.J.Res. 58, roll call #365 (130-297).  The measure received 33 fewer votes than
it had the previous year.  
On June 2, 2000, President Clinton announced his third annual waiver of Jackson-Vanik
amendment restrictions for Vietnam.  Joint resolutions disapproving the President’s action
were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 47) and the House (H.J.Res. 99).  On July 26, 2000,
the House voted down H.J.Res. 99, roll call 441 (91-332).  The measure received 39 fewer
votes than it had in 1999, and 72 fewer votes than it had in 1998.  Until the U.S.-Vietnam
bilateral trade agreement – which was signed on July 13, 2000 – goes into effect the waiver
does not change Vietnam’s current, non-most-favored-nation (MFN), trade status with the
United States.  Instead, in the absence of an approved trade agreement, the waiver only
allows OPIC and Export-Import Bank support for U.S. business in Vietnam. In order for the
agreement to go into effect, it must be approved by Congress and the Vietnamese National
Assembly.  
Recent U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Economic Ties — the Bilateral Trade Agreement
On December 10, 2001, a sweeping bilateral trade agreement (BTA) between the United
States and Vietnam entered into force.  (See CRS Report RL30416, The Vietnam-U.S.
Bilateral Trade Agreement.)  The two sides had signed the deal, which by law required
congressional approval, in July 2000, but it had taken over a year to complete the ratification
process.  Under the BTA, the U.S. will extend temporary normal trade relations status (NTR,
formerly most-favored nation [MFN]) to Vietnam, a move that would significantly reduce
U.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam.  In return, Hanoi agreed to undertake a wide
range of market-liberalization measures, including extending NTR treatment to U.S. exports,
reducing tariffs on goods, easing barriers to U.S. services (such as banking and
telecommunications), committing to protect certain intellectual property rights, and providing
additional inducements and protections for inward foreign direct investment. 
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The agreement paves the way for President Bush to extend temporary NTR treatment
to Vietnam.  NTR treatment would be temporary because Vietnam’s trade status would still
be subject to annual Congressional review under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974’s Jackson-Vanik
provisions, which govern trade with non-market economies. Congress will have this
opportunity in the coming weeks.  On June 3, 2002, President Bush renewed Vietnam’s year-
long waiver of Jackson-Vanik amendment restrictions on bilateral economic activities.
Congress can attempt to reject the waiver by passing a joint disapproval resolution. 
Implementation of the BTA.  Vietnam’s implementation of the BTA is likely to be
closely monitored by Congress, particularly during the annual debate over whether to extend
Vietnam’s NTR status.  Most of Vietnam’s concessions are due to be phased in within three
to five years.  However, a number of reforms took effect upon the BTA’s entry into force on
December 10, 2001.  These include according national treatment (i.e. not discriminating
between foreign and domestic enterprises) business activities, allowing all enterprises to
import and export, eliminating most non-tariff barriers, streamlining the process for foreign
investors to obtain licenses and approval, and publicizing laws, regulations and
administrative procedures pertaining to any matter covered by the Trade Agreement.  Hanoi
appears to have taken steps to implement nearly all of these initial commitments.  In May
2002, senior officials from Washington and Hanoi launched a Joint Committee on
Development of Economic and Trade Relations, a consultative body called for in the BTA.
U.S.-Vietnam Trade Flows.  In 2001, U.S.-Vietnam trade was worth $1.4 billion,
a 20% increase from 2000.  As shown in Table 1 below, since 1997 the U.S. has run a trade
deficit with Vietnam.  Imports from Vietnam are concentrated in a handful of products.
Shrimp, fuel products and footwear accounted for nearly two-thirds of total imports from
Vietnam in 2001.  Major U.S. exports to Vietnam in 2001 included aircraft, heavy and
electrical machinery, raw cotton, footwear parts, and fertilizer.  Nearly all of the $60 million
rise in U.S. exports from 2000 to 2001 is explained by the increase in sales of two items:
aircraft ($50 million) and cotton ($13 million).  For the first three months of 2002, imports
from Vietnam were over $300 million, a 57% increase from the same period last year.  
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to Vietnam Total Trade Trade Balance
1994 50.5 172.2 222.7  121.7
1995 199.0 252.9 451.9 53.9
1996 319.0 616.1 935.1  297.1
1997 388.2 277.8 666.0 -110.4
1998 553.4 274.2 827.6 -279.2
1999 601.9 277.3 879.2 -324.6
2000 827.4 330.5 1,157.9 -496.9
2001 1,026.4 393.8 1,420.2 -632.6
Jan-March 2001 192.1 80.3 272.4 -111.8
Jan-March 2002 301.7 107.2 408.9 -194.5
Major Imports 
from Vietnam  frozen shrimp, coffee, footwear, petroleum products, cashews
Major Exports 
to Vietnam 
 industrial & electronic machinery, fertilizer, raw cotton, aircraft 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission.  Data are for merchandise trade on a customs basis.
A Bilateral Textile Agreement.1  The BTA contains no restrictions on Vietnamese
textile exports to the U.S., but the safeguard provision would allow the U.S. to impose quotas
on textile imports in the event of a surge of imports.  During the  congressional debate over
the BTA, many Members urged the Bush Administration to negotiate a bilateral textile
agreement soon after the BTA came into effect.  Such an agreement would set quotas for
Vietnamese textile exports to the U.S. Additionally, some Members have pressed for a
commitment that a bilateral textile accord include provisions that would link the size of
Vietnam’s quotas to progress in its labor rights, similar to the U.S.-Cambodia textile
agreement.  In February 2002, the U.S. Special Negotiator on Textiles visited Vietnam to
begin preliminary talks on a textile agreement.  However, formal negotiations have not yet
begun, and the time frame for such negotiations has not been set.  The Vietnamese
government reportedly has been reluctant to enter into negotiations at an early date, arguing
that the two sides should not set quotas until the pattern of U.S.-Vietnam textile trade under
NTR rates becomes apparent.  Vietnam’s textile industry employs approximately 25% of the
country’s industrial workforce.  The U.S. could unilaterally impose quotas on Vietnam at any
time because Hanoi is not a member of the World Trade Organization. (For more information
on a prospective U.S.-Vietnam bilateral textile agreement, see CRS Report RL31470, The
Vietnam-U.S. Textile Agreement Debate: Trade Patterns, Interests, and Labor Rights, by
Nikki Sayres.)
In recent years, Vietnam has exported relatively few apparel products to the U.S. – just
over $47 million in 2000 and 2001 – because of the higher, non-MFN, tariff rates it faced
prior to the BTA entering into effect.  In contrast, Vietnamese garment exports to Japan and
the 15 countries of the European Union in 1999 totaled more than $500 million and $640
IB98033 06-28-02
2  “Special 301” refers to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974.  Since the start of the Special 301
provision in 1989, the USTR has issued annually a three-tier list of countries judged to have
inadequate regimes for IPR protection, or to deny access: 1) priority foreign countries are deemed
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priority watch list countries are considered to have major deficiencies in their IPR regime, but do
not currently warrant a Section 301 investigation; and 3) watch list countries, which maintain IPR
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million, respectively.  In the first quarter of 2002, the United States imported approximately
$38 million in textile and apparel products from Vietnam, an increase of over 2 ½ times the
amount for the same period last year.  During the same period, U.S. exports of  cotton to
Vietnam doubled to $8.4 million.  Figures for the first several months of 2002, however, may
not be indicative of the future pattern of trade, since it is likely that some shipments planned
for late 2001 were held off until the first quarter of 2002 in order to capitalize on the MFN
tariff rates.  
The Catfish Labeling Dispute.  The first significant potential post-BTA trade
dispute surfaced in 2001, when American catfish farmers and their supporters charged that
imports of Vietnamese catfish varieties (also known as basa and tra, from the pangasius
family of catfish) – which have increased sharply in recent years – were improperly labeled
as “catfish” and sold at a lower price than the North American varieties, which are of the
ictaluridae catfish family.  Section 10806 of the 2002 U.S. Farm Act (P.L. 107-171)
prohibits non-ictaluridae fish from being marketed as “catfish” in the United States.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).  In April 2002, the Bush Administration placed
Vietnam on its “Special 301 watch list” for allegedly poor protection of intellectual property
rights, particularly in the areas of music recordings and trademark protection.2  The BTA
requires Vietnam to make its IPR regime WTO-consistent by the middle of 2003.  
U.S. Bilateral Economic Assistance to Vietnam.  U.S. aid to Vietnam has
increased sharply in recent years.  Programs administered by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), for instance, rose from under $2 million in 1996 to
over $8 million in 2001.  In FY2002, total U.S. assistance to Vietnam – which includes
USAID programs – is expected to exceed $30 million, which includes funds budgeted for
food assistance ($11 million), the Fulbright exchange program ($4 million), HIV/AIDS
programs ($8.5 million), land mine victims and orphans ($3 million), a U.S. Department of
Labor technical cooperation program ($1.5 million), and technical assistance to help Vietnam
understand, develop, and implement trade reforms ($4.6 million).  This total includes $5
million that is budgeted for a new educational exchange program – the Vietnam Education
Foundation – that Congress authorized in 2000 but has yet to be implemented.  In November
2000, USAID officially opened an office in Hanoi, its first presence in Vietnam since the end
of the Vietnam War.
Political Ties
President Clinton visited Vietnam from November 16-20, 2000, the first trip by a U.S.
President since Richard Nixon went to Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) in July 1969.  The
purpose of the trip was largely symbolic, to highlight the degree to which the U.S. and
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Vietnam have normalized their relations since the Vietnam War.  The visit was notable for
the unexpected enthusiasm expressed by ordinary Vietnamese, who thronged by the thousand
to greet or catch a glimpse of the President and the First Lady.  These spontaneous outbursts,
combined with the President’s public and private remarks about human rights and
democratization, triggered rhetorical responses from conservative Vietnamese leaders.  
Throughout his three-day visit, President Clinton spoke to the Vietnamese about the
benefits of economic globalization (including implementing the bilateral trade agreement),
the rule of law, efforts to locate and repatriate the remains of U.S. soldiers, and Vietnam’s
record on human rights and religious freedom.  His speech at Vietnam National University
was televised live, although the portions mentioning human rights and religious freedom
were not mentioned in subsequent Vietnamese press reports.  The President also spent the
better part of a day dealing with Vietnam War-related issues, including traveling to a site
where Vietnamese workers were digging for the suspected remains of a fallen U.S. pilot.  
Vietnamese leaders pressed the U.S. for compensation for Agent Orange victims, for
assistance locating the remains of Vietnam’s soldiers who are still missing from fighting with
the U.S., and for an increase in the U.S.’ bilateral economic assistance program (the U.S.
pledged $21.9 million in bilateral aid to Vietnam in 2000).  During Clinton’s trip, the U.S.
took some small steps toward meeting these demands, including the following: U.S. and
Vietnamese officials agreed to meet later in 2000 to discuss joint research on the effects of
dioxin/Agent Orange; bilateral de-mining efforts were expanded; a science and technology
agreement was signed; a bilateral labor cooperation agreement was signed; the U.S. provided
materials to help locate the estimated 300,000 Vietnamese troops missing from the Vietnam
War; OPIC opened a $200 million line of credit to help U.S. companies finance projects in
Vietnam; and the U.S. announced that it would double its aid for HIV/AIDS prevention in
Vietnam.  
Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Hanoi from July 24-26, 2001 to attend the
ASEAN Regional forum (ARF).  While in Vietnam, Powell held meetings with senior
Vietnamese leaders. 
Human Rights
On humanitarian issues, U.S. law (P.L. 105-277, signed October 21, 1998),  requires
the Administration report annually on:
! Vietnam’s release of political and religious prisoners;
! Vietnam’s cooperation with the United States to obtain full and free access
to persons of humanitarian interest to the United States for interviews and
possible transfer to the United States.
The U.S. State Department and human rights groups have reported that Vietnam’s
human rights situation worsened in 2001, particularly with regard to the treatment of ethnic
minorities and unregistered religious groups.  There were reports that several prominent
dissidents were harassed and/or detained. Hanoi also retains strict controls over the
Vietnamese press.  During his July 2001 trip to Vietnam, Secretary of State Powell
reportedly raised the issues of human and religious rights in his conversations with
Vietnamese leaders, though he refrained from raising the issue in his public appearances.
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In August 2001, during the annual “human rights dialogue” with Vietnam, U.S. officials
reportedly raised a number of specific issues of concern, while Vietnam urged the U.S. to do
more to alleviate the continued suffering caused during the Vietnam War.  (For a discussion
of the Montagnard/Central Highlands refugee issue, see “Unrest in the Central Highlands”
below.) 
On the matter of religious freedom, U.S. law (P.L. 105-292, signed October 27, 1998),
requires the State Department to report to Congress annually on the state of religious freedom
in other countries.  In its 2000 report, the State Department noted that Vietnam’s respect for
the freedom of worship varies by region.  In some areas  — particularly around Ho Chi Minh
City, where there is a large concentration of Roman Catholics — local officials are relatively
tolerant, and Vietnamese religious officials have reported an increase in religious activity and
observance.  In August 1999, for example, authorities allowed approximately 200,000
Catholics to attend a special Mass in central Vietnam, in what was thought to be the largest
event not arranged by the Communist Party in its 24 years in power.  The Catholic Church
claims eight million followers out of Vietnam’s 76 million, predominantly Buddhist,
population.  
However, the State Department report noted that in other regions — particularly those
populated by ethnic minorities — authorities allow Vietnamese little discretion in practicing
their faith.  Indeed, according to Western human rights watch groups and State Department
officials, over the past several months the government has increased its repression of
unofficial religious organizations, particularly those in rural areas populated by ethnic
minorities.  Throughout the country, the government requires religious groups to register, and
uses this process to monitor and restrict the operations of religious groups.  Local officials
reportedly continue to detain and imprison Vietnamese citizens for their religious beliefs.
Recently, Western news sources have uncovered evidence of police raids on unofficial
Christian groups, and in October 2001, a prominent Catholic priest, Father Nguyen Van Ly,
was sentenced to 15 years in prison for anti-government activities.  On September 6, 2001,
the House passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 2833, by a vote of 410 - 1), which
would ban increases (over FY2001 levels) in non-humanitarian aid to the Vietnamese
government if the President does not certify that Vietnam is making “substantial progress”
in human rights.  The act allows the President to waive the cap on aid increases.  Vietnamese
officials harshly criticized the bill, arguing that U.S.-Vietnam ties must be based upon non-
interference in each other’s affairs. 
Security Issues
Bilateral security ties have slowly been improving in recent years.  In mid-March 2000,
U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen visited Vietnam, the first trip by a U.S. defense
secretary in nearly 30 years.  In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Vietnam granted U.S. military planes permission to fly through Vietnamese airspace.  In
February 2002, then-commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis
Blair, visited Vietnam and reportedly discussed Vietnam’s plans for the Cam Ranh Bay
military base, which will be abandoned by Russia when its lease expires in 2004.  In May
2002, Hanoi for the first time sent military observers to the annual U.S.-Thailand-Singapore
“Cobra Gold” military exercises. 
IB98033 06-28-02
CRS-11
The U.S. has also begun to cooperate with Vietnam on combating trade in illicit drugs.
Drug trafficking through Vietnam has risen dramatically in recent years, due to the country’s
proximity to heroin-producing areas in Laos and Burma, and to methyl-amphetamine
producing regions in southern China.  In February 2000, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
opened an office in Hanoi in February 2000.  On June 22, 2000, U.S. “drug czar” Barry
McCaffrey visited Vietnam to expand bilateral anti-narcotics efforts.
POW/MIA Issues
President Clinton’s receipt of the presumed remains of U.S. servicemen during his trip
to Vietnam was a symbol of the increased resources devoted by Vietnam to POW/MIA
research and analysis in recent years. By 1998 a substantial permanent staff in Vietnam was
deeply involved in frequent searches of aircraft crash sites and discussions with local
Vietnamese witnesses throughout the country.  The Vietnamese authorities also had allowed
U.S. analysts access to numerous POW/MIA-related archives and records.  The U.S. Defense
Department has reciprocated by allowing Vietnamese officials access to U.S. records and
maps to assist their  search for Vietnamese MIAs.
The increased efforts have led to substantial understanding about the fate of several
hundred of the over 2,000 Americans still unaccounted for in Indochina. On September 21,
1998, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Peterson told the media in reference to Americans still
listed as missing from the Vietnam War that “...it is very, very, very unlikely that you would
expect to see any live Americans discovered in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.”  He noted that
investigations of 121 reported sightings of missing Americans have ended in a “zero
outcome, not even a trace.”  Official U.S. policy, however, does not “remove a name from
the rolls” of those unaccounted for unless remains are identified.  (For more on the
POW/MIA issue, see CRS Issue Brief IB92101, POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting
Issues.)
Vietnam’s Situation
Ever since communist North Vietnamese forces defeated U.S.-backed South Vietnam
in 1975, reunified Vietnam has been struggling with how to maintain a balance between two
often contradictory goals – maintaining ideological purity and promoting economic
development.  For the first decade after reunification, the emphasis was on the former.  By
the mid-1980s, disastrous economic conditions led the country to adopt a more pragmatic
line, enshrined in the doi moi (renovation) economic reforms of 1986.  Under doi moi, the
government gave farmers greater control over what they produce, abandoned central state
planning, cut subsidies to state enterprises, reformed the price system, and opened the
country to foreign direct investment. 
Economic Developments
For the first decade after the doi moi reforms were launched, Vietnam became one of
the world’s fastest-growing countries, averaging around 8% annual GDP growth from 1990
to 1997. Agricultural production doubled, transforming Vietnam from a net food importer
into the world’s second-largest exporter of rice and third-largest producer of coffee.  The
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move away from a command economy also helped reduce poverty levels from 58% of the
population in 1992 to 37% in 1997.3  A substantial portion of the country’s growth was
driven by foreign investment, primarily from Southeast Asian sources, most of which the
government channeled into the country’s state-owned sector.
By the mid-1990s, however, the economic reform movement had stalled, as
disagreement between reformers and conservatives paralyzed economic decision-making.
The economy staggered after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as real GDP growth fell to 5.8%
in 1998, and 4.8% in 1999.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) plummeted to $600 million in
1999, the lowest level since 1992.  
Over the last two years, Vietnam’s economic situation has improved somewhat.
Growth rebounded to 6.7% in 2000 and 6.8% in 2001, and is expected to be at the 6-7% level
in 2002.  FDI commitments have increased, to the moderate level of $2.3 billion in 2001.
However, Vietnam remains an overwhelmingly poor country; about one-third of Vietnamese
children under 5 years of age suffer malnutrition.  Per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
is estimated at $370, equivalent to $1,850 when measured on a purchasing power parity
basis.  Growth continues to be impeded by Vietnam’s failure to tackle its remaining
structural economic problems — including unprofitable state-owned enterprises, a weak
banking sector, massive red tape, and bureaucratic corruption — as major impediments to
continued growth.  In recent months, there have been signs that the government has
redoubled its commitment to economic reforms.  
Rapid growth has transformed Vietnam’s economy, which has come to be loosely
divided into three sectors: the state-owned, the foreign-invested, and the privately owned,
which make up roughly 50%, 30%, and 20% of industrial output, respectively.  For much of
the 1990s, Vietnam’s foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) were among the country’s most
dynamic.  Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the private sector has also made impressive
gains, to the point where privately owned firms employ nearly a quarter of the workforce.
Most of the giant state-owned enterprises (SOEs), meanwhile, are functionally bankrupt, and
require significant government subsidies and assistance to continue operating.  In 1990, 2.5
million people were employed by state firms.  In 2001, this figure was down to 1.6 million.
Overseas Vietnamese.  In an effort to boost its economy, Hanoi in late October
1999 announced that overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu) will be allowed to travel to Vietnam
without visas.  The program is designed to encourage the estimated 2.5 million Vietnamese
living abroad to visit and work in their home country.  Remittances from overseas
Vietnamese totaled an estimated $1.7 billion in 2001, over 10% of Vietnam’s export earnings
that year.  
Political Trends
Vietnam’s experiments with political reform have lagged behind its economic changes.
A new constitution promulgated in 1992, for instance, reaffirmed the central role of the
Communist Party in politics and society, and Vietnam remains a one-party state.  Although
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personal freedoms have increased dramatically, Hanoi still does not tolerate signs of
organized political dissent.  In subtle ways, however, the decision to prioritize economic
development above ideological orthodoxy has led the Party to slowly loosen its former
stranglehold on political power.  Recognizing that Party cadres often were ill-suited to
administering its own policy directives, for instance, the Party created a more powerful and
professionalized executive branch in the 1992 constitution.  The new constitution also gave
more influence to the legislative branch, the National Assembly, in part because the Party
realized it needed to make the organs of government more responsive at the grass-roots level.
Over the past decade, the Assembly has slowly and subtly increased its influence.  In
December 2001, constitutional amendments were passed allowing the Assembly to hold no-
confidence votes against the government, and to dismiss the president and prime minister
(though not the general secretary of the Party). 
Rapid economic growth, increased integration with the global economy, and weak
domestic institutions have caused a rise in corruption and a decline in the Vietnamese
Communist Party’s (VCP) authority, alarming many Party hard-liners.  As a result,
Vietnamese policy-making in recent years has been virtually paralyzed, as reformist and
conservative elements within the Party have battled to a stalemate over how to deal with the
major economic and demographic forces transforming the country.  The former group calls
for a steady roll-out of new reforms and increased integration into the global economy.  The
latter fears that economic reform will lead to the loss of government control over the
economic means of production and financial and monetary levers; they also fear the possible
infiltration of heterodox outside ideas.  Vietnam’s consensus-based decision-making style,
combined with the absence of any paramount leader, has meant that these divisions have
produced only piecemeal economic reforms, though implementing the BTA may force more
significant changes. 
The 9th Party Congress.  Vietnamese Communist Party Congresses, which are held
every five years, often are the occasions for major leadership realignments and set the
direction for Vietnam’s economic, diplomatic, and social policies.  At its ninth Party
Congress that ended on April 22, 2001, Vietnam’s Communist Party selected Nong Duc
Manh as its Secretary General, the Party’s top post.  Manh (60) is generally considered to
be more moderate than his predecessor, Le Ka Phieu (69), a conservative who was ousted
after a heated struggle.  Significantly, Manh’s selection was made possible when the Party’s
Central Committee rejected – an unprecedented move – the Politburo’s decision to endorse
Phieu for another term.  Manh, the former speaker of Vietnam’s National Assembly, is an
ethnic Tay, making him the first member of an ethnic minority to head Vietnam’s
Communist Party.  In other significant moves, the 9th Party Congress reduced the size of the
Politburo (from 19 to 15 members), retired seven Politburo members, and shrunk the Central
Committee from 170 to 150 members.
Manh’s selection as Secretary General is but the latest in a long string of seemingly
contradictory personnel shifts and policy moves that Vietnam-watchers have been struggling
to interpret for signs that the economic reformers or hard-liners have gained the upper hand.
Manh’s selection has not yet resulted in the expected acceleration of reforms, as he has
devoted most of his attention to an anti-corruption campaign that features greater local
supervision of local authorities.  A sign that Manh may have begun to try to revive the doi
moi (economic renovation) process occurred in January 2002, when he directed the Party to
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begin considering how to develop the private sector and whether Party members should be
allowed to start their own businesses.
Vietnam’s new leadership will have to confront the problem of how to reverse the
Communist Party’s declining legitimacy.  Attracting new recruits into the Party has become
increasingly difficult, particularly among young Vietnamese – a major problem since more
than half of the population is under the age of 25.  Some prominent retired military leaders,
including war hero General Vo Nguyen Giap, have publicly called for the Party to become
more democratic. 
Unrest in the Central Highlands Region.  Additionally, over the past several
years, there have been reports of protests and riots by peasants in the Central Highlands
provinces against local government corruption and by ethnic minorities against encroachment
on their ancestral lands by recent settlers. In February 2001, thousands of minorities,
primarily from Montagnard groups, protested in the Central Highlands, the largest-scale
social unrest in years.  The Vietnamese government dispatched military troops and local
police to quell the unrest, and in the spring of 2001 launched a crackdown against the
protesters. Vietnam has accused U.S. groups of providing financial and logistical support to
the protestors.  Hanoi has also criticized the United States for granting asylum to 24
Vietnamese refugees, all members of the Central Highlands minority groups that protested,
who fled into Cambodia following the unrest.  Some refugees reported that the Vietnamese
government has imprisoned and tortured many protestors.  Hundreds of asylum seekers from
Vietnam remain in Cambodia.  A repatriation agreement signed in January 2002 by Vietnam,
Cambodia, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) crumbled
after Vietnam refused to abide by its agreement to allow the UNHCR access to the Central
Highlands to monitor refugee returns.  To settle the dispute, Cambodia in late March 2001
accepted an offer from the United States to resettle the more than 900 Montagnards that
remained in Cambodia.  There is speculation that Vietnam’s acquiescence to the plan was
obtained by Cambodia’s pledge to close its borders to future asylum-seekers from Vietnam.
Foreign and Defense Policy
For many years, a major impediment to Vietnam’s development was the strong
international sanctions imposed in response to Vietnam’s 1978 invasion and subsequent 11-
year occupation of Cambodia.  Faced with a cutoff of much aid from the Soviet bloc, the
Vietnamese in the early 1990s increased their flexibility on a Cambodian settlement, moved
to accommodate China on sensitive issues, and stepped up action on the POW/MIA and
other humanitarian issues with the United States.  In the mid-1990s, Hanoi continued the
process of rejoining the world political community by joining the regional political group,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional security forum, the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the regional economic group, the Asian Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Vietnam has had periodic spats with its neighbors over the islands in the South China
Sea.  In 1974, China seized the Paracel island chain from Vietnam.  In 1988, the Vietnamese
and Chinese navies clashed over conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands, parts or all of
which are also claimed by Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.  Although most
of the Spratlys are low-lying reefs and rocky outcrops, the sea bed beneath them is thought
to contain massive oil and gas reserves, and the 155,000 square miles of surrounding waters
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are home to rich fishing grounds.  Hanoi’s latest flare-up in the Spratlys occurred in October
1999, when Vietnamese troops on Tennent Reef fired at a Filipino reconnaissance plane
flying low over a suspected Vietnamese military installation. 
In recent years, Hanoi has improved ties with many of its neighbors, the October 1999
incident with Manila notwithstanding.  Most significantly, Vietnam has moved to fully
normalize relations with mainland China.  Following Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s
four-day visit to Vietnam in early December, for instance, the two sides signed a long-elusive
land border treaty on December 30, 1999.  In late December 2000, Vietnamese President
Tran Duc Long travelled to Beijing, where he signed an agreement establishing the two
countries’ sea border in the Gulf of Tonkin.  The two countries, however, still have
overlapping claims to the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea, differences that led
to military clashes in the late 1980s.  Along with other Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam has
tried – thus far unsuccessfully – to convince China to agree to a multilateral code of conduct
for the South China Sea.  Vietnam did not push the issue in 2001 during its tenure as chair
of the standing committee of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Shortly after assuming the ASEAN chair, Vietnam rebuffed United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan’s suggestion that it convene a troika of ASEAN ministers to help start
a dialogue between Myanmar’s military government and dissident Aung San Suu Kyi.  A
Vietnamese official said that Hanoi had rejected the idea because it constituted an
unwarranted “interference” in Myanmar’s affairs.  During the 2000 annual meeting of
ASEAN Foreign Ministers, participants had agreed that the organization should form a troika
of officials to resolve political and security problems of common concern in the region.
In 1999 and 2000, Vietnam improved its historically troubled relations with Cambodia,
sending a high-level delegation to Phnom Penh, strongly supporting Cambodia’s entry into
ASEAN in early 1999, and pledging to resolve outstanding border disagreements by the end
of 2000.  On November 26, 1999, Vietnam signed a cross-border agreement with Laos and
Thailand to harmonize and simplify regulations governing flows of goods, vehicles, and
people.  The deal is part of the proposed $350 million, 240 mile East-West Transport
Corridor highway project designed to link areas of Laos and Thailand to the port of Da Nang
in central Vietnam.  There have been reports that Vietnamese troops have assisted the
Laotian regime in combating an insurgency by ethnic minorities.  In March 2001, Russian
President Vladimir Putin visited Vietnam, where the two countries signed a new strategic
partnership agreement, and restructured Vietnam’s Soviet-era debt to Russia.  In the summer
of 2001, the Russian Defense Minister announced that Moscow would not renew its lease
of the Cam Ranh Bay military base on Vietnam’s southeast coast.  The lease, which the
Soviet Union and Russia had held since the late 1970s, is due to expire in 2004.
Issues For Congress
If past events are any guide, future steps to improve U.S.-Vietnam relations are likely
to remain controversial in the United States and Vietnam.  Potential issues of concern to the
U.S. Congress could include:
! Consideration of a Presidential waiver of Jackson-Vanik restrictions;
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! Calling attention to Vietnam’s record on human, religious, and labor  rights,
and possibly linking these issues to the Jackson-Vanik waiver or to U.S.
non-humanitarian assistance to Vietnam;
! Pushing for the U.S. and Vietnam to negotiate a bilateral agreement on trade
in textiles;
! Granting of Generalized System of Preference (GSP) status to a range of
Vietnamese imports. 
! Increase of U.S. foreign assistance. 
Congress plays a funding, authorizing, or oversight role in each of these issues.
Congressional supporters of warmer U.S. relations with Vietnam include Members who
support growing U.S. business interests in Vietnam.  Many Members also supported Clinton
Administration arguments that improved relations with Vietnam help U.S. strategic interests
in working closely with friends and allies to promote stability and development by
integrating Vietnam more fully into the East Asian regional order.  The Clinton
Administration contended that increasing U.S. economic, political, and other interaction with
Vietnam is a good way to promote political liberalization in the country.  Finally, there are
Members who believe that the United States is more likely to elicit Vietnamese cooperation
on POW/MIA, human rights, or other sensitive issues through a policy of closer
“engagement,” rather than one that restricts ties until Vietnam meets firm U.S. conditions.
Against these advocates are those Members who are sharply critical of the Vietnamese
government’s repressive political regime and human rights’ violations, including suppression
of religious freedom; those who represent U.S. constituencies concerned with poor labor
conditions in many industries in Vietnam; those who see no significant U.S. interest in
stimulating the economic development of this regime; and those who represent some
Vietnamese-American constituencies that strongly oppose the current Hanoi government.
LEGISLATION
H.J.Res. 101 (Rohrabacher) 
Disapproves the Bush Administration’s extension of the waiver of Jackson-Vanik trade
restrictions on Vietnam.  Introduced June 25, 2002; referred to House Ways and Means
Committee. 
H.R. 2833 (Christopher Smith)
Withholds bilateral non-humanitarian unless Vietnam receives a Presidential
certification that it is meeting certain human rights conditions.  Introduced September 5,
2001; referred to Committees on International Relations and Financial Services.  Passed by
the House, 410-1 (roll call 335) on September 6, 2001.
